than if he were forced to be good, or any more than we should thank one of our fellow-
creatures who did us good, not freely, and of good will, or from any kindness of heart, but
from mere compulsion, or extrinsical necessity? Arminians suppose, that God is necessarily
a good and gracious Being; for this they make the ground of some of their main arguments
against many doctrines maintained by Calvinists; they say, these are certainly false, and it
is impossible they should be true, because they are not consistent with the goodness of God.
This supposes, that it is impossible but that God should be good: for if it be possible that he
should be otherwise, then that impossibility of the truth of these doctrines ceases according
to their own argument.
That virtue in God is not, in the most proper sense, rewardable, is not for want of merit
in his moral perfections and actions, sufficient to deserve rewards from his creatures; but
because he is infinitely above all capacity of receiving any reward. He is already infinitely
and unchangeably happy, and we cannot be profitable unto him. But still he is worthy of
our supreme benevolence for his virtue: and would be worthy of our beneficence, which is
the fruit and expression of benevolence, if our goodness could extend to him. If God deserves
to be thanked and praised for his goodness, he would, for the same reason, deserve that we
should also requite his kindness, if that were possible. “What shall I render unto the Lord
for all his benefits?” is the natural language of thankfulness: and so far as in us lies, it is our
duty to render again according to benefits received. And that we might have opportunity for
so natural an expression of our gratitude to God, as beneficence, notwithstanding his being
infinitely above our reach, he has appointed others to be his receivers, and to stand in his
stead, as the objects of our beneficence; such are especially our indigent brethren.
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SECTION I. God's moral Excellency necessary, yet virtuous and praise-worthy.…