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will resides the power which acts on the wills of all created spirits, helping the good, judging
the evil, controlling all, granting power to some, not granting it to others. For, as He is the
creator of all natures, so also is He the bestower of all powers, not of all wills; for wicked
wills are not from Him, being contrary to nature, which is from Him. As to bodies, they
are more subject to wills: some to our wills, by which I mean the wills of all living mortal
creatures, but more to the wills of men than of beasts. But all of them are most of all subject
to the will of God, to whom all wills also are subject, since they have no power except what
He has bestowed upon them. The cause of things, therefore, which makes but is not made,
is God; but all other causes both make and are made. Such are all created spirits, and espe-
cially the rational. Material causes, therefore, which may rather be said to be made than to
make, are not to be reckoned among efficient causes, because they can only do what the
wills of spirits do by them. How, then, does an order of causes which is certain to the fore-
knowledge of God necessitate that there should be nothing which is dependent on our wills,
when our wills themselves have a very important place in the order of causes? Cicero, then,
contends with those who call this order of causes fatal, or rather designate this order itself
by the name of fate; to which we have an abhorrence, especially on account of the word,
which men have become accustomed to understand as meaning what is not true. But,
whereas he denies that the order of all causes is most certain, and perfectly clear to the
prescience of God, we detest his opinion more than the Stoics do. For he either denies that
God exists,—which, indeed, in an assumed personage, he has labored to do, in his book De
Natura Deorum,—or if he confesses that He exists, but denies that He is prescient of future
things, what is that but just “the fool saying in his heart there is no God?” For one who is
not prescient of all future things is not God. Wherefore our wills also have just so much
power as God willed and foreknew that they should have; and therefore whatever power
they have, they have it within most certain limits; and whatever they are to do, they are most
assuredly to do, for He whose foreknowledge is infallible foreknew that they would have
the power to do it, and would do it. Wherefore, if I should choose to apply the name of fate
to anything at all, I should rather say that fate belongs to the weaker of two parties, will to
the stronger, who has the other in his power, than that the freedom of our will is excluded
by that order of causes, which, by an unusual application of the word peculiar to themselves,
the Stoics call Fate.
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Concerning the Foreknowledge of God and the Free Will of Man, in Opposition…