SECT. VI.
Liberty of Indifference, not only not necessary to Virtue, but utterly inconsistent with it;
and all, either virtuous or vicious habits or inclinations, inconsistent with Arminian notions
of Liberty and moral Agency.
To suppose such a freedom of Will, as Arminians talk of, to be requisite to Virtue and
Vice, is many ways contrary to common sense.
If Indifference belong to Liberty of Will, as Arminians suppose, and it be essential to a
virtuous action, that it be performed in a state of Liberty, as they also suppose; it will follow,
that it is essential to a virtuous action, that it be performed in a state of Indifference: and if
it be performed in a state of Indifference, then doubtless it must be performed in the time
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of Indifference. And so it will follow, that in order to the Virtue of an act, the heart must
be indifferent in the time of the performance of that act, and the more indifferent and cold
the heart is with relation to the act performed, so much the better; because the act is per-
formed with so much the greater Liberty. But is this agreeable to the light of nature? Is it
agreeable to the notions which mankind in all ages have of Virtue, that it lies in what is
contrary to Indifference, even in the tendency and inclination of the heart to virtuous action;
and that the stronger the inclination, and so the further from Indifference, the more virtuous
the heart, and so much the more praiseworthy the act which proceeds from it?
If we should suppose (contrary to what has been before demonstrated) that there may
be an act of Will in a state of Indifference; for instance, this act, viz. The Will determining
to put itself out of a state of Indifference, and to give itself a preponderation one way; then
it would follow, on Arminian principles, that this act or determination of the Will is that
alone wherein Virtue consists, because this only is performed, while the mind remains in a
state of Indifference, and so in a state of Liberty: for when once the mind is put out of its
equilibrium, it is no longer in such a state; and therefore all the acts, which follow afterwards,
proceeding from bias, can have the nature neither of Virtue nor Vice. Or if the thing which
the Will can do, while yet in a state of Indifference, and so of Liberty, be only to suspend
acting, and determine to take the matter into consideration; then this determination is that
alone wherein Virtue consists, and not proceeding to action after the scale is turned by
consideration. So that it will follow, from these principles, that whatever is done after the
mind, by any means, is once out of its equilibrium, and arises from an inclination, has
nothing of the nature of Virtue or Vice, and is worthy of neither blame or praise. But how
plainly contrary is this to the universal sense of mankind, and to the notion they have of
sincerely virtuous actions! Which is, that they proceed from a heart well disposed and well
inclined; and the stronger, the more fixed and determined, the good disposition of the heart,
the greater the sincerity of Virtue, and so the more of its truth and reality. But if there be
any acts, which are done in a state of equilibrium, or spring immediately from perfect Indif-
ference and coldness of heart, they cannot arise from any good principle or disposition in
SECTION VI. Liberty of Indifference, not only not necessary to Virtue, but utterly inconsistent with it; and all, either virtuous or vicious habits or inclinations, inconsistent with Arminian notions of Liberty and moral Agency.
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SECTION VI. Liberty of Indifference, not only not necessary to Virtue,…