The first existence of an evil disposition, amounting to a full consent to Adam’s sin, no
more infers God being the author of that evil disposition in the child, than in the father. The
first arising or existing of that evil disposition in the heart of Adam, was by God’s permission;
who could have prevented it, if he had pleased, by giving such influences of his Spirit, as
would have been absolutely effectual to hinder it; which, it is plain in fact, he did withhold:
and whatever mystery may be supposed in the affair, yet no Christian will presume to say,
it was not in perfect consistence with God’s holiness and righteousness, notwithstanding
Adam had been guilty of no offence before. So root and branches being one, according to
God’s wise constitution, the case in fact is, that by virtue of this oneness answerable changes
or effects through all the branches co-exist with the changes in the root: consequently an
evil disposition exists in the hearts of Adam’s posterity, equivalent to that which was exerted
in his own heart, when he eat the forbidden fruit. Which God has no hand in, any otherwise,
than in not exerting such an influence, as might be effectual to prevent it; as appears by what
was observed in the former chapter. 145
But now the grand objection is against the reasonableness of such a constitution, by
which Adam and his posterity should be looked upon as one, and dealt with accordingly,
in an affair of such infinite consequence; so that if Adam sinned, they must necessarily be
and the same thing. And therefore if the former be not contrary to the divine perfections, so neither is the latter.
Our adversaries contend with us chiefly on this account, that according to our doctrine of original sin, such an
imputation of the first sin is maintained, whereby God, without any regard to universal native corruption, esteems
all Adam’s posterity as guilty, and holds them as liable to condemnation, purely on account of that sinful act of
their first parent: so that they without any respect had to their own sin, and so, as innocent in themselves, are
destined to eternal punishment.—I have therefore ever been careful to show, that they do injurously suppose
those things to be separated in our doctrine which are by no means separated. The whole of the controversy
they have with us about this matter, evidently arises from this, that they suppose the mediate and the immediate
imputation are distinguished one from the other, not only in the matter of conception, but in reality. And so
indeed they consider imputation only as immediate and abstractly from the mediate; when yet our divines
suppose, that neither ought to be considered separately from the other. Therefore I chose not to use any such
distinction, or to suppose any such thing, in what I have said on the subject: but only have endeavoured to explain
the thing itself, and to reconcile it with divine attributes. And therefore I have everywhere conjoined both these
conceptions concerning the imputation of the first sin, as inseparable; and judged, that one ought never to be
considered without the other.—While I have been writing this note, I consulted all the systems of divinity, which
I have by me, that I might see what was the true and genuine opinion of our chief divines in this affair: and I
found that they were of the same mind with me: namely, that these two kinds of imputation are by no means
to be separated, or to be considered abstractly one from the other, but that one does involve the other.” He there
particularly cites these two famous reformed divines, Vitringa and Lampins. Tom. iv. cap 17. § 78.
145 See also p. 39, note, § 8, &c. 48 § 12, &c. 80 § 9, &c. 82§ 17, &c. 121 § 7, &c.
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CHAPTER III. The Imputation of Adam's Sin stated.