described, viz. a being or doing wrong with the Will, and resentment in others, and pain
inflicted on the person in whom this moral evil is. Which natural sense is what we call by
the name of conscience.
It is true, the common people and children, in their notion of any faulty act or deed, of
any person, do suppose that it is the person’s own act and deed. But this is all that belongs
to what they understand by a thing being a person’s own deed or action; even that it is
something done by him of choice. That some exercise or motion should begin of itself, does
not belong to their notion of an action, or doing. If so, it would belong to their notion of it,
that it is the cause of its own beginning: and that is as much as to say, that it is before it begins
to be. Nor is their notion of an action some motion or exercise, that begins accidentally,
without any cause or reason; for that is contrary to one of the prime dictates of common
sense, namely, that every thing that begins to be, has some cause or reason why it is.
The common people, in their notion of a faulty or praiseworthy work done by any one,
do suppose, that the man does it in the exercise of liberty. But then their notion of liberty
is only a person having opportunity of doing as he pleases. They have no notion of liberty
consisting in the Will first acting, and so causing its own acts; determining, and so causing
its own determinations; or choosing, and so causing its own choice. Such a notion of liberty
is what none have, but those that have darkened their own minds with confused metaphys-
ical speculation, and abstruse and ambiguous terms. If a man is not restrained from acting
as his Will determines, or constrained to act otherwise; then he has liberty, according to
common notions of liberty, without taking into the idea that grand contradiction of all, the
determinations of a man’s free Will being the effects of the determinations of his free
Will.—Nor have men commonly any notion of freedom consisting in indifference. For if
so, then it would be agreeable to their notion, that the greater indifference men act with,
the more freedom they act with; whereas, the reverse is true. He that in acting proceeds with
the fullest inclination, does what he does with the greatest freedom, according to common
sense. And so far is it from being agreeable to common sense, that such liberty as consists
in indifference is requisite to Praise or Blame, that, on the contrary, the dictate of every
man’s natural sense through the world is, that the further he is from being indifferent in his
acting good or evil, and the more he does either with full and strong inclination, the more
is he esteemed or abhorred, commended or condemned.
II. If it were inconsistent with the common sense of mankind, that men should be either
blamed or commended in any volitions, in case of moral Necessity or impossibility; then it
would surely also be agreeable to the same sense and reason of mankind, that the nearer the
case approaches to such a moral Necessity or impossibility—either through a strong ante-
cedent moral propensity, on the one hand, 140 or a great antecedent opposition and difficulty,
140 It is here argued, on supposition that not all propensity implies moral necessity, but only some very high
degree; which none will deny.
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SECTION IV. It is agreeable to common sense, and the natural notions of…