cellence; in other words, that happiness which is ultimate and supreme, is filled by nothing short of supreme
love to God, or, in language more philosophically accurate, consent of will to BEING in general—benevolent
attachment to universal being. 9. Now who can question whether temperance, fidelity, meekness, honesty and
liberality, philanthropy and public spirit, should be ranked among the virtues? And who can doubt that they
are calculated to secure the happiness implied in health, friendship, national prosperity, and the welfare of the
human race, respectively? And yet, if we exclude the disposition which is required to fill the largest circle—be-
nevolent attachment to universal being—which of these virtues may not an atheist actually possess? Nay, may
not an atheist possess them all? For may he not promote his health by temperance, moderation, chastity, and
the like? May he not exercise friendly benevolence, fidelity, prudence, sympathy, and similar virtues? Have not
atheists been great patriots, if by patriotism we mean a supreme regard for the prosperity and glory of the nation
to which they belonged, manifested by severe studies, by the lightning and thunder of their eloquence, the fatigues
of war, and a willingness to shed the last drop of their blood in defence of their country? Nay more, may not an
atheist possess the virtues of generous philanthropy, and, to a certain extent, of benevolent zeal for the welfare
of mankind in general, expressed by an attempt to remove their ignominious chains, to promote the civilization
of savage nations whom he has never seen, to alleviate the sufferings and to enhance the comforts of all mankind?
10. Far be it from us to suppose that atheists are favourable to virtue, even in these inferior acceptations of the
term. The reverse is abundantly evident. But this is what we assert, that such virtues as those above mentioned,
when exclusive of what our author contends for, are what an atheist may possess, without inconsistency; and
that they have no moral worth, no direct connexion, either with the complacency of God in them, or with the
ultimate happiness of the agent. However attentive a man may be to practise the virtues in subservience to his
health, while he repels those of friendship; or however observant of the virtues of friendship, while he repels
others which are conducive to domestic, national, and universal happiness; his virtues, if the name be retained,
are those of a bad character. Some have been conspicuous and zealous patriots, while determined foes to philan-
thropy and general good will to mankind as such. And how many have fought with the most patriotic zeal and
courage in the field of honour, though tyrants at home, and in private life trampling on those virtues which
constitute a good husband, a good father, a good master, a good neighbour, a good friend, or a good any thing.
In short, were a man to “give all his goods to feed the poor, and his body to be burned,” out of zeal to promote
some public good, yet without love to God, without benevolent attachment to universal being, he is morally
nothing, or worse than nothing. 11. What are called virtues, without a disposition to embrace universal being
and excellence, are, morally considered, but lifeless images. To compare them to a series of decimal figures,
which, however increased, will never amount to an unit of moral worth, is to place them in too favourable a
view; they are more like cyphers. But let these unmeaning cyphers be preceded by a figure, let these images have
an informing and invigorating principle, let these dry bones have the spirit of life in them, and they will acquire
a moral excellence; they will deserve the name of real virtues. 12. Some have defined virtue, by calling it, “a
tendency to ultimate happiness.” If the meaning of this definition be, “a tendency to God, in whom our ultimate
happiness is found,” it may be admitted; otherwise, it seems not admissible on many accounts. Tendency may
be considered as either voluntary or involuntary. In the first place, let us suppose it to be voluntary. We then
observe, that it is not rational, nor even compatible with common sense, to say, that virtue is a voluntary tendency
to a quality of our own minds, as happiness evidently is. For happiness, from its very nature, is a relative state,
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CHAPTER I. Concerning the essence of true virtue.