them, and to signify a property by a word which for the time takes a negative form, and vice
versa. For it is allowable, instead of saying that He Himself has no primal cause, to describe
Him as the First Cause of all, and again, instead of this, to hold that He alone exists ungen-
erately, so that while the words seem by the formal change to be at variance with each other,
the sense remains one and the same. For the object to be aimed at, in questions respecting
God, is not to produce a dulcet and melodious harmony of words, but to work out an ortho-
dox formula of thought, whereby a worthy conception of God may be ensured. Since, then,
it is only orthodox to infer that He Who is the First Cause of all is Himself without cause,
if this opinion is established, what further contention of words remains for men of sense
and judgment, when every word whereby such a notion is conveyed to us has the same sig-
nification? For whether you say that He is the First Cause and Principle of all, or speak of
Him as without origin, whether you speak of Him as of ungenerate or eternal subsistence,
as the Cause of all or as alone without cause, all these words are, in a manner, of like force,
and equivalent to one another, as far as the meaning of the things signified is concerned;
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and it is mere folly to contend for this or that vocal intonation, as if orthodoxy were a thing
of sounds and syllables rather than of the mind. This view, then, has been carefully enunciated
by our great master, whereby all whose eyes are not blindfolded by the veil of heresy may
clearly see that, whatever be the nature of God, He is not to be apprehended by sense, and
that He transcends reason, though human thought, busying itself with curious inquiry, with
such help of reason as it can command, stretches out its hand and just touches His unap-
proachable and sublime nature, being neither keen-sighted enough to see clearly what is
invisible, nor yet so far withheld from approach as to be unable to catch some faint glimpse
of what it seeks to know. For such knowledge it attains in part by the touch of reason, in
part from its very inability to discern it, finding that it is a sort of knowledge to know that
what is sought transcends knowledge (for it has learned what is contrary to the Divine
nature, as well as all that may fittingly be conjectured respecting it). Not that it has been
able to gain full knowledge of that nature itself about which it reasons, but from the know-
ledge of those properties which are, or are not, inherent in it, this mind of man sees what
alone can be seen, that that which is far removed from all evil, and is understood in all good,
is altogether such as I should pronounce ineffable and incomprehensible by human reason.
But although our great master has thus cleared away all unworthy notions respecting
the Divine nature, and has urged and taught all that may be reverently and fittingly held
concerning it, viz. that the First Cause is neither a corruptible thing, nor one brought into
being by any birth, but that it is outside the range of every conception of the kind; and that
from the negation of what is not inherent, and the affirmation of what may be with reverence
conceived to be inherent therein, we may best apprehend what He is—nevertheless this
vehement adversary of the truth opposes these teachings, and hopes with the sounding word
“ungeneracy” to supply a clear definition of the essence of God.
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Answer to Eunomius' Second Book.