Chapter
LVIII.
But we have something more to say to Celsus, when he
declares that “the soul is the work of God, and that the nature
of body is different,” and puts forward such an opinion not only
without proof, but even without clearly defining his meaning; for he
did not make it evident whether he meant that every soul is the work of
God, or only the rational soul. This, then, is what we have to
say: If every soul is the work of God, it is manifest that those
of the meanest irrational animals are God’s work, so that the
nature of all bodies is different from that of the soul. He
appears, however, in what follows, where he says that “irrational
animals are more beloved by God than we, and have a purer knowledge of
divinity,” to maintain that not only is the soul of man, but in a
much greater degree that of irrational animals, the work of God; for
this follows from their being said to be more beloved by God than
we. Now if the rational soul alone be the work of God, then, in
the first place, he did not clearly indicate that such was his opinion;
and in the second place, this deduction follows from his indefinite
language regarding the soul—viz., whether not every one, but only
the rational, is the work of God—that neither is the nature of
all bodies different (from the soul). But if the nature of all
bodies be not different, although the body of each animal correspond to
its soul, it is evident that the body of that animal whose soul was the
work of God, would differ from the body of that animal in which dwells
a soul which was not the work of God. And so the assertion will
be false, that there is no difference between the body of a bat, or of
a worm, or of a frog, and that of a man.