4. This other volition, which has only some indirect concern with the duty required,
cannot excuse for the want of that good will itself, which is commanded; being not the thing
which answers and fulfils the command, and being wholly destitute of the virtue which the
command seeks.
Further to illustrate this matter: If a child has a most excellent father that has ever treated
him with fatherly kindness and tenderness, and has every way, in the highest degree, merited
his love and dutiful regard, and is withal very wealthy; but the son is of so vile a disposition,
that he inveterately hates his father; and yet, apprehending that his hatred of him is like to
prove his ruin, by bringing him finally to those abject circumstances, which are exceedingly
adverse to his avarice and ambition; he, therefore, wishes it were otherwise: but yet remaining
under the invincible power of his vile and malignant disposition, he continues still in his
settled hatred of his father. Now, if such a son’s indirect Willingness to love and honour his
father, at all acquits or excuses before God, for his failing of actually exercising these dispos-
itions towards him, which God requires, it must be on one of these accounts. (1.) Either,
That it answers and fulfils the command. But this it does not by the supposition; because
the thing commanded is love and honour to his worthy parent. If the command be proper
and just, as is supposed, then it obliges to the thing commanded; and so nothing else but
that can answer the obligation. Or, (2.) It must be at least, because there is that virtue or
goodness in his indirect Willingness, that is equivalent to the virtue required; and so balances
or countervails it, and makes up for the want of it. But that also is contrary to the supposition.
The Willingness the son has merely from a regard to money and honour, has no goodness
in it, to countervail the want of the pious filial respect required.
Sincerity and reality, in that indirect Willingness, which has been spoken of, does not
make it the better. That which is real and hearty is often called sincere; whether it be in virtue
or vice. Some persons are sincerely bad; others are sincerely good; and others may be sincere
and hearty in things, which are in their own nature indifferent; as a man may be sincerely
desirous of eating when he is hungry. But being sincere, hearty, and in good earnest, is no
virtue, unless it be in a thing that is virtuous. A man may be sincere and hearty in joining a
crew of pirates, or a gang of robbers. When the devils cried out, and besought Christ not to
torment them, it was no mere pretense; they were very hearty in their desires not to be tor-
mented: but this did not make their Will or Desire virtuous. And if men have sincere Desires,
which are in their kind and nature no better, it can be no excuse for the want of any required
virtue.
And as a man’s Sincerity in such an indirect Desire or willingness to do his duty, as has
been mentioned, cannot excuse for the want of performance; so it is with Endeavours arising
from such a Willingness. The Endeavours can have no more goodness in them, than the
Will of which they are the effect and expression. And, therefore, however sincere and real,
and however great a person’s Endeavours are; yea, though they should be to the utmost of
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SECTION V. That Sincerity of Desires and Endeavours, which is supposed…