§9. Then, distinguishing between essence and generation, he declares the empty and
frivolous language of Eunomius to be like a rattle. He proceeds to show that the language used
by the great Basil on the subject of the generation of the Only-begotten has been grievously
slandered by Eunomius, and so ends the book.
I will pass by these matters, however, as the absurdity involved is evident; let us examine
what precedes. He says that nothing else is found, “besides the essence of the Son, which
admits of the generation.” What does he mean when he says this? He distinguishes two
names from each other, and separating by his discourse the things signified by them, he sets
each of them individually apart by itself. “The generation” is one name, and “the essence”
is another. The essence, he tells us, “admits of the generation,” being therefore of course
something distinct from the generation. For if the generation were the essence (which is the
very thing he is constantly declaring), so that the two appellations are equivalent in sense,
he would not have said that the essence “admits of the generation”: for that would amount
to saying that the essence admits of the essence, or the generation the generation,—if, that
is, the generation were the same thing as the essence. He understands, then, the generation
to be one thing, and the essence to be another, which “admits of generation”: for that which
is taken cannot be the same with that which admits it. Well, this is what the sage and system-
atic statement of our author says: but as to whether there is any sense in his words, let him
consider who is expert in judging. I will resume his actual words.
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He says that he finds “nothing else besides the essence of the Son which admits of the
generation”; that there is no sense in his words however, is clear to every one who hears his
statement at all: the task which remains seems to be to bring to light the blasphemy which
he is trying to construct by aid of these meaningless words. For he desires, even if he cannot
effect his purpose, to produce in his hearers by this slackness of expression, the notion that
the essence of the Son is the result of construction: but he calls its construction “generation,”
decking out his horrible blasphemy with the fairest phrase, that if “construction” is the
meaning conveyed by the word “generation,” the idea of the creation of the Lord may receive
a ready assent. He says, then, that the essence “admits of generation,” so that every construc-
tion may be viewed, as it were, in some subject matter. For no one would say that that is
constructed which has no existence, so extending “making” in his discourse, as if it were
some constructed fabric, to the nature of the Only-begotten God678. “If, then,” he says, “it
678 This whole passage, as it stands in Oehler’s text, (which has here been followed without alteration,) is
obscure: the connection between the clauses themselves is by no means clear; and the general meaning of the
passage, in view of the succeeding sentences, seems doubtful. For it seems here to be alleged that Eunomius
considered the κατασκεύη to imply the previous existence of some material, so to say, which was moulded by
generation—on the ground that no one would say that the essence, or anything else, was constructed without
being existent. On the other hand it is immediately urged that this is just what would be said of all created things.
If the passage might be emended thus:—ἵν᾽, ὥσπερ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ τινὶ πράγματι πᾶσα κατασκεύη θεωρεῖται,
Then, distinguishing between essence and generation, he declares the empty and frivolous language of Eunomius to be like a rattle. He proceeds to show that the language used by the great Basil on the subject of the generation of the Only-begotten has been grievously slandered by Eunomius, and so ends the book.
326
Then, distinguishing between essence and generation, he declares the empty…