As when there is a chain of many links, the first of which only is taken hold of and drawn
by hand; all the rest may follow and be moved at the same instant, without any distance of
time; but yet the motion of one link is before that of another in the order of nature; the last
is moved by the next, and that by the next, and so till we come to the first; which not being
moved by any other, but by something distinct from the whole chain, this as much proves
that no part is moved by any self-moving power in the chain, as if the motion of one link
followed that of another in the order of time.
(2.) If any should say, that the determining act is not before the determined act, either
in the order of time, or of nature, nor is distinct from it; but that the exertion of the act is
the determination of the act; that for the soul to exert a particular volition, is for it to cause
15
and determine that act of volition: I would on this observe, that the thing in question seems
to be forgotten, or kept out of sight, in a darkness and unintelligibleness of speech; unless
such an objector would mean to contradict himself.—The very act of volition itself is
doubtless a determination of mind; i.e. it is the mind’s drawing up a conclusion, or coming
to a choice between two or more things proposed to it. But determining among external
objects of choice, is not the same with determining the act of choice itself, among various
possible acts of choice.—The question is, What influences, directs, or determines the mind
or Will to come to such a conclusion or choice as it does? Or what is the cause, ground, or
reason, why it concludes thus, and not otherwise? Now it must be answered, according to
the Arminian notion of freedom, that the Will influences, orders, and determines itself thus
to act. And if it does, I say, it must be by some antecedent act. To say, it is caused, influenced,
and determined by something, and yet not determined by any thing antecedent, either in
order of time or nature, is a contradiction. For that is what is meant by a thing’s being prior
in the order of nature, that it is someway the cause or reason of the thing, with respect to
which it is said to be prior.
If the particular act or exertion of will, which comes into existence, be any thing properly
determined at all, then it has some cause of existing, and of existing in such a particular
determinate manner, and not another; some cause, whose influence decides the matter:
which cause is distinct from the effect, and prior to it. But to say, that the Will or mind orders,
influences, and determines itself to exert an act by the very exertion itself, is to make the
exertion both cause and effect; or the exerting such an act, to be a cause of the exertion of
such an act. For the question is, What is the cause and reason of the soul’s exerting such an
act? To which the answer is, The soul exerts such an act, and that is the cause of it. And so,
by this, the exertion must be distinct from, and in the order of nature prior to, itself.
(3.) If the meaning be, that the soul’s exertion of such a particular act of will, is a thing
that comes to pass of itself, without any cause; and that there is absolutely no reason of the
soul being determined to exert such a volition, and make such a choice, rather than another;
I say, if this be the meaning of Arminians, when they contend so earnestly for the Will de-
548
SECTION II. Several supposed ways of evading the foregoing reasoning, considered.…