CHAP. II. CHRISTIAN RELIGION. 307
whether he still possesses it in some, though in a very feeble
and limited degree — a degree so feeble and limited, that it can
do nothing of itself, but when assisted by grace, is able also
to perform its part. The Master of the Sentences, (Lom
bard, ibid.) wishing to explain this, teaches that a twofold
grace is necessary to fit for any good work. The one he
calls Operating. To it, it is owing that we effectually will
what is good. The other, which succeeds this good will, and
aids it, he calls Co-operating. My objection to this division
(see infra, chap. iii. sec. 10, and chap. vii. sec. 9) is, that while
it attributes the effectual desire of good to divine grace, it
insinuates that man, by his own nature, desires good in some
degree, though ineffectually. Thus Bernard, while main
taining that a good will is the work of God, concedes this
much to man, viz., that of his own nature he longs for such
a good will. This differs widely from the view of Augustine,
though Lombard pretends to have taken the division from
him. Besides, there is an ambiguity in the second division,
which has led to an erroneous interpretation. For it has been
thought that we co-operate with subsequent grace, inasmuch
as it pertains to us either to nullify the first grace, by reject
ing it, or to confirm it, by obediently yielding to it. The
author of the work De Vocatione Gentium expresses it thus :
It is free to those who enjoy the faculty of reason to depart
from grace, so that the not departing is a reward, and that
which cannot be done without the co-operation of the
Spirit is imputed as merit to those whose will might have
made it otherwise, (Lib. ii. cap. iv.) It seemed proper to
make these two observations in passing, that the reader may
see how far I differ from the sounder of the Schoolmen.
Still further do I differ from more modern sophists, who have
departed even more widely than the Schoolmen from the
ancient doctrine. The division, however, shows in what
respect free will is attributed to man. For Lombard ulti
mately declares, (Lib. ii. Dist. 25,) that our freedom is not to
the extent of leaving us equally inclined to good and evil in
act or in thought, but only to the extent of freeing us from
compulsion. This liberty is compatible with our being de
praved, the servants of sin, able to do nothing but sin.