existence of a good disposition of heart, what is the character of that choice? There can, ac-
cording to our natural notions, be no virtue in a choice which proceeds from no virtuous
principle, but from mere self-love, ambition, or some animal appetites; therefore, a virtuous
temper of mind may be before a good act of choice, as a tree may be before the fruit, and
the fountain before the stream which proceeds from it.
The following things, in Mr. Hutcheson’s inquiry concerning moral good and evil, are
evidently agreeable to the nature of things, and the voice of human sense and reason. (Sect.
II. p. 132, 133.) ” Every action which we apprehend as either morally good or evil, is always
supposed to flow from some affections towards sensitive natures. And whatever we call
virtue or vice, is either some such affection, or some action consequent upon it.—All the
actions counted religious in any country, are supposed by those who count them so, to flow
from some affections towards the Deity: and whatever we call social virtue, we still suppose
to flow from affections towards our fellow-creatures.—Prudence, if it is only employed in
promoting private interest, is never imagined to be a virtue.” In these things Dr. Turnbull
expressly agrees with Mr. Hutcheson, his admired author. 32
If a virtuous disposition or affection is before its acts, then they are before those virtuous
acts of choice which proceed from it. Therefore, there is no necessity that all virtuous dis-
positions or affections should be the effect of choice : and so, no such supposed necessity
can be a good objection against such a disposition being natural, or from a kind of instinct,
implanted in the mind in its creation. Agreeably to this Mr. Hutcheson says, (Ibid. sect. III.
p. 196, 197.) “I know not for what reason some will not allow that to be virtue, which flows
from instinct or passions. But how do they help themselves? They say, virtue arises from
reason. What is reason, but the sagacity we have in prosecuting any end? The ultimate end
proposed by common moralists, is the happiness of the agent himself. And this certainly
he is determined to pursue from instinct. Now may not another instinct towards the public,
or the good of others, be as proper a principle of virtue as the instinct towards private hap-
piness? If it be said, that actions from instinct are not the effect of prudence and choice, this
objection will hold full as strongly against the actions which flow from self-love.”
And if we consider what Dr. T. declares, as his own notion of the essence of virtue, and
which he so confidently and often affirms, that it should follow choice, and proceed from
it, we shall find it is no less repugnant to that sentiment, than it is to the nature of things,
and the general notions of mankind. For it is his notion, as well as Mr. Hutcheson’s, that
the essence of virtue lies in good affection, and particularly in benevolence or love: as he very
fully declares in these words in his Key, 33 “That the word that signifies goodness and mercy
should also signify moral rectitude in general, will not seem strange, if we consider that love
32 Mor. Phil. p. 112-115. p. 142 et alibi passim.
33 Marginal Note, annexed to § 356.
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SECTION I. Concerning Adam's original righteousness.