Letter VI.
(a.d. 389.)
To Augustin Nebridius Sends Greeting.
1. Your letters I have great pleasure in keeping as carefully as my own eyes. For they are
great, not indeed in length, but in the greatness of the subjects discussed in them, and in
the great ability with which the truth in regard to these subjects is demonstrated. They shall
bring to my ear the voice of Christ, and the teaching of Plato and of Plotinus. To me,
therefore, they shall ever be pleasant to hear, because of their eloquent style; easy to read,
because of their brevity; and profitable to understand, because of the wisdom which they
contain. Be at pains, therefore, to teach me everything which, to your judgment, commends
itself as holy or good. As to this letter in particular, answer it when you are ready to discuss
a subtle problem in regard to memory, and the images presented by the imagination.1452
My opinion is, that although there can be such images independently of memory, there is
no exercise of memory independently of such images.1453 You will say, What, then, takes
place when memory is exercised in recalling an act of understanding or of thought? I answer
this objection by saying, that such acts can be recalled by memory for this reason, that in
the supposed act of understanding or of thought we gave birth to something conditioned
by space or by time, which is of such a nature that it can be reproduced by the imagination:
for either we connected the use of words with the exercise of the understanding and with
the thoughts, and words are conditioned by time, and thus fall within the domain of the
senses or of the imaginative faculty; or if we did not join words with the mental act, our in-
tellect at all events experienced in the act of thinking something which was of such a nature
as could produce in the mind that which, by the aid of the imaginative faculty, memory
could recall. These things I have stated, as usual, without much consideration, and in a
somewhat confused manner: do you examine them, and, rejecting what is false, acquaint
me by letter with what you hold as the truth on this subject.
2. Listen also to this question: Why, I should like to know, do we not affirm that the
phantasy [imaginative faculty] derives all its images from itself, rather than say that it receives
these from the senses? For it is possible that, as the intellectual faculty of the soul is indebted
to the senses, not for the objects upon which the intellect is exercised, but rather for the
admonition arousing it to see these objects, in the same manner the imaginative faculty may
be indebted to the senses, not for the images which are the objects upon which it is exercised,
but rather for the admonition arousing it to contemplate these images. And perhaps it is in
this way that we are to explain the fact that the imagination perceives some objects which
1452 Phantasia.
1453 Quamvis non omnis phantasia cum memoria sit, omnis tamen memoria, sine phantasia esse non possit.
Nebridius to Augustin
521
Nebridius to Augustin