SECT. IV.
Concerning Mr. W.‘s notion of a public profession of godliness in terms of an indeterminate
and double signification.
According to Mr. W. the profession of godliness must be in words not of a determinate
meaning, or without any discrimination in the meaning of the words, obliging us to under-
stand them of saving religion, (p. 6. c. d.) They must make an open declaration of their sincere
consent to the terms of the covenant, without any discrimination, by which it can be determ-
ined, that the consent signified by the words is a gracious consent. (p. 9. c.) And without
any marks of difference, or any distinction in the words, whereby we can be enabled to judge
when they mean a saving faith, and when a different one. (p. 10. c. e. p. 50. e. and p. 53. c.)
That nothing should be expressed in the words of the profession, but what some unsanctified
men may say, and speak true. (p. 47. e.) He supposes, that the primitive Christians in the
profession they made of faith, did not speak only in that sense, viz. so as to signify justifying
faith; and that the persons admitted did not understand that their profession was understood
by those that admitted them, only in that sense, (p. 58. c.)
Agreeable to this notion of making a profession in words of indiscriminate meaning,
and professing godliness without godliness, and yet speaking true, Mr. W. (in p. 44. d. e.)
allows, that men must be by profession godly persons, in order to come to the sacrament;
and yet in the next sentence he denies, that christian grace itself is requisite in the person
who is to come to the sacrament, or that the dictate of his conscience that he has it, is the
thing that gives him a right to offer himself. And agreeable to this last clause, Mr. Stoddard
(of whose opinion Mr. W. professes himself fully to be) expressly maintains, that a man
may and ought to come to the Lord’s supper, though he knows himself to be in a natural
condition. (Doct. of Inst. Churches, p. 21. See also his sermon on this controversy, p. 13.) So
that putting these things together, it must be agreeable to Mr. W.‘s scheme, that a man has
a right to make a profession of godliness, without having godliness, and without any dictate
of his conscience that he has the thing he professes, yea, though he knows he has not! And
all this is made out by the doctrine of professing godliness in words that are ambiguous,
and of two meanings.
This notion of a solemn profession of godliness, in words of a double meaning, without
any marks of difference in their signification, is the great peculiarity of Mr. W.‘s scheme; and
in all his controversy with me, this appears to be the main hinge, the crisis of the whole affair.
Therefore I would particularly consider it. And for the greater distinctness and clearness, I
will lay down certain positions, as of most evident truth; observing some of their no less
plain and evident consequences.
I. Words declare or profess nothing any otherwise than by their signification: for to
declare or profess something by words, is to signify something by words. And therefore, if
nothing is signified by words of a pretended profession, nothing is really professed; and if
SECTION IV. Of an indeterminate profession.
1928
SECTION IV. Of an indeterminate profession.