only like warts growing out of the soul’s thinking part, which are reckoned as parts of it
because they adhere to it, and yet are not that actual thing which the soul is in its essence.
440
And yet, I rejoined to the virgin, we see no slight help afforded for improvement to the
virtuous from all these conditions. Daniel’s desire was his glory; and Phineas’ anger pleased
the Deity. We have been told, too, that fear is the beginning of wisdom, and learnt from
Paul that salvation is the goal of the “sorrow after a godly sort.” The Gospel bids us have a
contempt for danger; and the “not being afraid with any amazement” is nothing else but a
describing of courage, and this last is numbered by Wisdom amongst the things that are
good. In all this Scripture shows that such conditions are not to be considered weaknesses;
weaknesses would not have been so employed for putting virtue into practice.
I think, replied the Teacher, that I am myself responsible for this confusion arising from
different accounts of the matter; for I did not state it as distinctly as I might have, by intro-
ducing a certain order of consequences for our consideration. Now, however, some such
order shall, as far as it is possible, be devised, so that our essay may advance in the way of
logical sequence and so give no room for such contradictions. We declare, then, that the
speculative, critical, and world-surveying faculty of the soul is its peculiar property by virtue
of its very nature1795, and that thereby the soul preserves within itself the image of the divine
grace; since our reason surmises that divinity itself, whatever it may be in its inmost nature,
is manifested in these very things,—universal supervision and the critical discernment
between good and evil. But all those elements of the soul which lie on the border-land1796
and are capable from their peculiar nature of inclining to either of two opposites (whose
eventual determination to the good or to the bad depends on the kind of use they are put
to), anger, for instance, and fear, and any other such-like emotion of the soul divested of
which human nature1797 cannot be studied—all these we reckon as accretions from without,
because in the Beauty which is man’s prototype no such characteristics are to be found. Now
let the following statement1798 be offered as a mere exercise (in interpretation). I pray that
1795 Reading κατὰ φύσιν αὐτήν, καὶ τῆς θεοειδοῦς χάριτος, κ. τ. λ. with Sifanus.
1796 ὅσα δε τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν μεθορί& 251· κεῖται. Moller (Gregorii Nysseni doctrina de hominis naturâ) remarks
rightly that Krabinger’s translation is here incorrect: “quæcunque autem in animæ confinio posita sunt”; and
that τῆς ψυχῆς should on the contrary be joined closely to ὅσα. The opposition is not between elements which
lie in, and on the confines of the soul, but between the divine and adventitious elements within the soul: μεθορί&
251· refers therefore to “good and bad,” below.
1797 This is no contradiction of the passage above about Moses: there it was stated that the Passions did not
belong to the essence (ουσία) of man.
1798 ὅδε δὴ. The Teacher introduces this λόγος with some reserve. “We do not lay it down ex cathedrâ, we
put it forward as open to challenge and discussion as we might do in the schools (ὡς ἐν γυμνασί& 251·).” It is
best then to take διαφύγοι as a pure optative. Gregory appears in his answer to congratulate her on the success
of this “exercise.” “To any one that reflects…your exposition…bears sufficiently upon it the stamp of correctness,
819
On the Soul and the Resurrection.