to make Him out to be a mere conception of a name?) why does he fight with shadows,
contending with imaginary propositions? Is not the cause of this unreasonable litigiousness
clear, that, feeling ashamed of the fallacy respecting ungeneracy with which his dupes have
been deluded (since it has been proved that the word is very far removed from the Divine
essence), he is deliberately shuffling up his arguments, shifting the controversy from words
to things, so that by throwing all into confusion the unwary may more easily be seduced,
by imagining that God has been described by us either as a conception, or as posterior in
existence to the invention of human terminology; and thus, leaving our argument unrefuted,
he is shifting his position to another quarter of the field? For our conclusion was, as I have
said, that the term ungeneracy does not indicate the Divine nature, but is applicable to it as
the result of a conception by which the fact that God subsists without prior cause is pointed
at. But what they were for establishing was this: that the word was indicative of the Divine
essence itself. Yet how has it been established that the word has this force? I suppose the
handling of this question is in reserve in some other of his writings. But here he makes it
his main object to show that God exists ungenerately, just as though some one were simply
questioning him on such points as these—what view he held as to the term ungenerate,
whether he thought it invented to show that the First Cause was without beginning and
origin, or as declaring the Divine essence itself; and he, with much assumption of gravity
and wisdom, were replying that he, for his part, had no doubt that God was the Maker of
heaven and earth. How widely this method of proceeding differs from, and is unconnected
with, his first contention, you may see, in the same way as you may see how little his fine
description of his controversy with us is connected with the question at issue. For let us look
at the matter in this wise.
They say that God is ungenerate, and in this we agree. But that ungeneracy itself consti-
tutes the Divine essence, here we take exception. For we maintain that this term is declarative
of God’s ungenerate subsistence, but not that ungeneracy is God. But of what nature is his
refutation? It is this: that before man’s creation God existed ungenerately. But what has this
to do with the point which he promises to establish, that the term and its Subject are
identical? For he lays it down that ungeneracy is the Divine essence. But what sort of a ful-
filment of his promise is it, to show that God existed before beings capable of speech? What
a wonderful, what an irresistible demonstration! what perfection of logical refinement! Who
that has not been initiated in the mysteries of the awful craft may venture to look it in the
face? Yet in particularizing the meanings of the term “conception,” he makes a solemn
travesty of it. For, saith he, of words used to express a conception of the mind, some exist
only in pronunciation, as for instance those which signify nonentity, while others have their
peculiar meaning; and of these some have an amplifying force, as in the case of things colossal,
others a diminishing, as in that of pigmies, others a multiplying, as in that of many-headed
monsters, others a combinative, as in that of centaurs. After thus reducing the force of the
506
Answer to Eunomius' Second Book.