1. In that disposition to approve or disapprove the moral treatment which passes between
us and others, from a determination of the mind to be easy or uneasy, in a consciousness
of our being consistent or inconsistent with ourselves. Hereby we have a disposition to ap-
prove our own treatment of another, when we are conscious to ourselves that we treat him
so as we should expect to be treated by him, were he in our case and we in his; and to disap-
prove of our own treatment of another, when we are conscious that we should be displeased
with the like treatment from him, if we were in his case. So we in our consciences approve
of another’s treatment of us, if we are conscious to ourselves, that if we were in his case, and
he in ours, we should think it just to treat him as he treats us; and disapprove his treatment
of us, when we are conscious that we should think it unjust, if we were in his case. Thus
men’s consciences approve or disapprove the sentence of their judge, by which they are ac-
quitted or condemned. But this is not all that is in natural conscience. Besides this approving
or disapproving from uneasiness as being inconsistent with ourselves, there is another thing
that must precede it, and be the foundation of it. As for instance, when my conscience dis-
approves my own treatment of another, being conscious to myself, that were I in his case,
I should be displeased and angry with him for so treating me; the question might be asked,
What would be the ground of that supposed disapprobation, displeasure, and anger, which
I am conscious would be in me in that case? Therefore,
2. The other thing which belongs to the approbation or disapprobation of natural con-
science, is the sense of desert which was spoken of before; consisting, as was observed, in a
natural agreement, proportion, and harmony, between malevolence or injury, and resentment
and punishment; or between loving and being loved, between showing kindness and being
rewarded, &c. Both these kinds of approving or disapproving, concur in the approbation
or disapprobation of conscience: the one founded on the other. Thus, when a man’s con-
science disapproves of his treatment of his neighbour, in the first place, he is conscious, that
if he were in his neighbour’s stead, he should resent such treatment from a sense of justice,
or from a sense of uniformity and equality between such treatment, and resentment, and
punishment; as before explained. And then, in the next place, he perceives, that therefore
he is not consistent with himself, in doing what he himself should resent in that case; and
hence disapproves it, as being naturally averse to opposition to himself.
Approbation and disapprobation of conscience, in the sense now explained, will extend
to all virtue and vice; to every thing whatsoever that is morally good or evil, in a mind which
does not confine its view to a private sphere, but will take things in general into its consid-
eration, and is free from speculative error. For, as all virtue or moral good may be resolved
into love to others, either God or creatures; so, men easily see the uniformity and natural
agreement there is between loving others, and being accepted and favoured by others. And
all vice, sin, or moral evil summarily consisting in the want of this love to others, or in
malevolence; so, men easily see the natural agreement there is between hating and doing ill
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CHAPTER V. Natural conscience, and the moral sense.