CHAP. VI.
Of particular instincts of nature, which in some respects resemble virtue.
There are various dispositions and inclinations natural to men, which depend on par-
ticular laws of nature, determining their minds to certain affections and actions towards
particular objects; which laws seem to be established chiefly for the preservation of mankind,
and their comfortably subsisting in the world. These dispositions may be called instincts.
Some of these instincts respect only ourselves personally: such are many of our natural
appetites and aversions. Some of them are more social, and extend to others: such are the
mutual inclinations between the sexes, &c.—some of these dispositions are more external
and sensitive: such are those that relate to meat and drink, and the more sensitive inclinations
of the sexes towards each other. Others are more internal and mental: consisting in affections
which mankind naturally exercise towards some of their fellow-creatures, and in some cases
towards men in general. Some of these may be called kind affections; as having something
in them of benevolence, or a resemblance of it: and others are of an angry appearance; such
as the passion of jealousy between the sexes, especially in the male towards the female.
It is only the former of these two last mentioned sorts that it is to my purpose to consider
in this place, viz. those natural instincts which have the appearance of benevolence, and so
in some respects resemble virtue. These I shall therefore consider; and shall endeavour to
show, that none of them can be of the nature of true virtue.
That kind affection which is exercised one towards another in natural relation, particu-
larly the love of parents to their children, called natural affection, is by many referred to
instinct. I have already considered this sort of love as an affection that arises from self-love;
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and in that view, have shown it cannot be of the nature of true virtue. But if any think, that
natural affection is more properly to be referred to a particular instinct of nature than to
self-love, as its cause, I shall not think it a point worthy of any controversy or dispute. In
my opinion both are true; viz. that natural affection is owing to natural instinct, and also
that it arises from self-love. It may be said to arise from instinct, as it depends on a law of
nature. But yet it may be truly reckoned as an affection arising from self-love; because,
though it arises from a law of nature, yet that is such a law as according to the order and
harmony every where observed among the laws of nature, is connected with and follows
from self-love; as was shown before. However, it is not necessary to my present purpose to
insist on this. For if natural affection to a man’s children, or near relations, is an affection
arising from a particular independent instinct of nature—which the Creator in his wisdom
has implanted in men for the preservation and well-being of the world of mankind: yet it
cannot be of the nature of true virtue. For it has been observed, and, I humbly conceive,
proved before, (Chap. 2.) that if any being or beings have by natural instinct, or any other
means, a determination of mind to benevolence, extending only to some particular persons
or private system, however large that system may be—or however great a number of indi-
CHAPTER VI. Of particular instincts of nature
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CHAPTER VI. Of particular instincts of nature