another. And therefore, the wickedness of the latter does not lie in the former, but is distinct
from it; and the wickedness of both lies in the evil Nature of the things which are wicked.
The thing, which makes sin hateful, is that by which it deserves punishment; which is
but the expression of hatred. And that, which renders virtue lovely, is that on account of
which it is fit to receive praise and reward; which are but the expressions of esteem and love.
But that which makes vice hateful, is its hateful Nature; and that which renders virtue lovely,
is its amiable Nature. It is a certain beauty or deformity that are inherent in that good or
evil will, which is the soul of virtue and vice (and not in the occasion of it,) which is their
worthiness of esteem or disesteem, praise or dispraise, according to the common sense of
mankind. If the Cause or occasion of the rise of a hateful disposition or act of Will, be also
hateful; suppose another antecedent evil will; that is entirely another sin, and, deserves
punishment by itself, under a distinct consideration. There is worthiness of dispraise in the
Nature of an evil volition, and not wholly in some foregoing act, which is its Cause; otherwise
the evil volition, which is the effect, is no moral evil, any more than sickness, or some other
natural calamity, which arises from a Cause morally evil.
Thus, for instance, ingratitude is hateful and worthy of dispraise, according to common
sense; not because something as bad, or worse than ingratitude, was the Cause that produced
it; but because it is hateful in itself, by its own inherent deformity. So the love of virtue is
amiable, and worthy of praise, not merely because something else went before this love of
virtue in our minds, which caused it to take place there—for instance, our own choice; we
choose to love virtue, and, by some method or other, wrought ourselves into the love of
it—but because of the amiableness and condecency of such a disposition and inclination of
heart. If that was the case, that we did choose to love virtue, and so produced that love in
ourselves, this choice itself could be no otherwise amiable or praiseworthy, than as love to
virtue, or soma other amiable inclination, was exercised and implied in it. If that choice was
amiable at all, it must be so on account of some amiable quality in the Nature of the choice.
If we chose to love virtue, not in love to virtue, or any thing that was good, and exercised
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no sort of good disposition in the choice, the choice itself was not virtuous nor worthy of
any praise, according to common sense, because the choice was not of a good Nature.
It may not be improper here to take notice of something said by an author, that has
lately made a mighty noise in America. “A necessary holiness (says he 137 ) is no holi-
ness.—Adam could not be originally created in righteousness and true holiness, because he
must choose to be righteous, before he could be righteous. And therefore he must exist, he
must be created, yea, he must exercise thought and reflection, before he was righteous.”
There is much more to the same effect, (p. 437, 438, 439, 440.) If these things are so, it will
certainly follow, that the first choosing to be righteous is no righteous choice; there is no
137 Scrip. Doc. Of Original Sin, p. 180. 3d Edit.
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SECTION I. The Essence of the virtue and vice of dispositions of the heart,…