SECT. IV.
It is agreeable to common sense, and the natural notions of mankind, to suppose moral
Necessity In be consistent with Praise and Blame, Reward and Punishment.
Whether the reasons, that have been given, why it appears difficult to some persons, to
reconcile with common sense the praising or blaming, rewarding or punishing, those things
which are morally necessary, are thought satisfactory, or not; yet it most evidently appears,
by the following things, that if this matter be rightly understood, setting aside all delusion
arising from the impropriety and ambiguity of terms, this is not at all inconsistent with the
natural apprehensions of mankind, and that sense of things which is found every where in
the common people; who are furthest from having their thoughts perverted from their
natural channel, by metaphysical and philosophical subtilties; but, on the contrary, altogether
agreeable to, and the very voice and dictate of, this natural and vulgar sense.
I. This will appear, if we consider what the vulgar notion of blameworthiness is. The
idea which the common people, through all ages and nations, have of faultiness, I suppose
to be plainly this; a person being or doing wrong, with his own will and pleasure; containing
these two things: 1. His doing wrong, when he does as he pleases. 2. His pleasure being
wrong. Or, in other words, perhaps more intelligibly expressing their notion; a person
having his heart wrong, and doing wrong from his heart. And this is the sum total of the
matter.
The common people do not ascend up in their reflections and abstractions to the
metaphysical sources, relations, and dependences of things, in order to form their notion
of faultiness or blameworthiness. They do not wait till they have decided by their refinings,
what first determines the Will; whether it be determined by something extrinsic, or intrinsic;
whether volition determines volition, or whether the understanding determines the Will;
whether there be any such tiling as metaphysicians mean by contingence (if they have any
meaning); whether there be a sort of a strange unaccountable sovereignty in the Will, in the
exercise of which, by its own sovereign acts, it brings to pass all its own sovereign acts. They
do not take any part of their notion of Fault or Blame from the resolution of any such
questions. If this were the case, there are multitudes, yea the far greater part of mankind,
nine hundred and ninety-nine out of a thousand, would live and die, without having any
such notion, as that of Fault, ever entering into their heads, or without so much as once
having any conception that any body was to be either blamed or commended for any thing.
If this were the case, it would be a long time before men came to have such notions.
Whereas it is manifest, they are in fact some of the first notions that appear in children; who
discover, as soon as they can think, or speak, or act at all as rational creatures, a sense of
desert. And, certainly, in forming their notion of it, they make no use of metaphysics. All
the ground they go upon, consists in these two things: experience and a Natural sensation
of a certain fitness or agreeableness, which there is in uniting such moral evil as is above
SECTION IV. It is agreeable to common sense, and the natural notions of mankind, to suppose moral Necessity to be consistent with Praise and Blame, Reward and Punishment.
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SECTION IV. It is agreeable to common sense, and the natural notions of…