righteousness or holiness in it, because no choosing to be righteous goes before it. For he
plainly speaks of choosing to be righteous, as what must go before righteousness; and that
which follows the choice, being the effect of the choice, cannot be righteousness or holiness:
for an effect is a thing necessary, and cannot prevent the influence or efficacy of its Cause;
and therefore is unavoidably dependent upon the Cause; and he says a necessary holiness is
no holiness. So that neither can a choice of righteousness be righteousness or holiness, nor
can any thing that is consequent on that choice, and the effect of it, be righteousness or
holiness; nor can any thing that is without choice, be righteousness or holiness. So that by
his scheme, all righteousness and holiness is at once shut out of the world, and no door left
open, by which it can ever possibly enter into the world.
I suppose, the way that men came to entertain this absurd inconsistent notion—with
respect to internal inclinations and volitions themselves, (or notions that imply it,) viz. that
the Essence of their moral good or evil lies not in their Nature, but their Cause—was, that
it is indeed a very plain dictate of common sense, that it is so with respect to all outward
actions, and sensible motions of the body; that the moral good or evil of them does not lie
at all in the motions themselves; which, taken by themselves, are nothing of a moral nature;
and the Essence of all the moral good or evil that concerns them, lies in those internal dis-
positions and volitions which are the Cause of them. Now, being always used to determine
this, without hesitation or dispute, concerning external Actions; which in the common use
of language are signified by such phrases, as men’s actions or their doings; hence, when they
came to speak of volitions, and internal exercises of their inclinations, under the same de-
nomination of their actions, or what they do, they unwarily determined the case must also
be the same with these as with external actions; not considering the vast difference in the
Nature of the case.
If any shall still object and say, why is it not necessary that the Cause should be con-
sidered, in order to determine whether any thing be worthy of blame or praise? is it agreeable
to reason and common sense, that a man is to be praised or blamed for that which he is not
the Cause or author?
I answer, such phrases as being the Cause, being the author, and the like, are ambiguous.
They are most vulgarly understood for being the designing voluntary Cause, or Cause by
antecedent choice: and it is most certain, that men are not, in this sense, the Causes or authors
of the first act of their Wills, in any case; as certain as any thing is, or ever can be; for nothing
can be more certain, than that a thing is not before it is, nor a thing of the same kind before
the first thing of that kind; and so no choice before the first choice.—As the phrase, being
the author, may be understood, not of being the producer by an antecedent act of Will, but
as a person may be said to be the author of the act of Will itself, by his being the immediate
agent, or the being that is acting, or in exercise in that act; if the phrase of being the author,
is used to signify this, then doubtless common sense requires men being the authors of their
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SECTION I. The Essence of the virtue and vice of dispositions of the heart,…