which anything is annexed. Therefore he says that Anaxagoras “did not see that motion
joined to sensation and to it” (i.e. linked to it in unbroken connection) “is impossible in the
infinite” (that is, in a substance which is infinite), as if treating of material substances, to
which nothing can be joined except at their boundaries. Moreover, in the succeeding
words—“and that sensation of which the whole system of nature is not sensible when struck
is an impossibility”2405—Cicero speaks as if Anaxagoras had said that mind—to which he
ascribed the power of ordering and fashioning all things—had sensation such as the soul
has by means of the body. For it is manifest that the whole soul has sensation when it feels
anything by means of the body; for whatever is perceived by sensation is not concealed from
the whole soul. Now, Cicero’s design in saying that the whole system of nature must be
conscious of every sensation was, that he might, as it were, take from the philosopher that
mind which he affirms to be infinite. For how does the whole of nature experience sensation
if it be infinite? Bodily sensation begins at some point, and does not pervade the whole of
any substance unless it be one in which it can reach an end; but this, of course, cannot be
said of that which is infinite. Anaxagoras, however had not said anything about bodily sen-
sation. The word “whole,” moreover, is used differently when we speak of that which is
immaterial, because it is understood to be without boundaries in space, so that it may be
spoken of as a whole and at the same time as infinite—the former because of its completeness,
the latter because of its not being limited by boundaries in space.
25. “Furthermore,” says Cicero, “if he will affirm that the mind itself is, so to speak,
some kind of animal, there must be some principle from within from which it receives the
name ‘animal,’”—so that mind, according to Anaxagoras, is a kind of body, and has within
it an animating principle, because of which it is called “animal.” Observe how he speaks in
language which we are accustomed to apply to things corporeal,—animals being in the or-
dinary sense of the word visible substances,—adapting himself, as I suppose, to the blunted
perceptions of those against whom he argues; and yet he has uttered a thing which, if they
could awake to perceive it, might suffice to teach them that everything which presents itself
to our minds as a living body must be thought of not as itself a soul, but as an animal having
a soul. For having said, “There must be something within from which it receives the name
animal,” he adds, “But what is deeper within than mind?” The mind, therefore, cannot have
any inner soul, by possessing which it is an animal; for it is itself that which is innermost.
If, then, it is an animal, let it have some external body in relation to which it may be within;
for this is what he means by saying, “It is therefore girt round by an exterior body,” as if
Anaxagoras had said that mind cannot be otherwise than as belonging to some animal. And
2405 The words of Cicero are these: “Nec vidit neque motum sensui junctum et continentem in infinito ullum
esse posse, neque sensum omnino quo non tota natura pulsa sentiret.” Augustin, quoting probably from memory
(see § 9), gives infinto as the dative of possession instead of in infinito.
968
To Dioscorus