which inquiries would be even ridiculous; as, I think, every person must see at once, in the
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case propose of two sounds, being only the same repeated, absolutely without any difference,
but that one circumstance of time. If the Most High sees it will answer some good end, that
the same sound be made thunder at two distinct times, and therefore wills that it should be
so, must it needs therefore be, that herein there is some act of God’s Will without any motive
or end? God saw fit often, at distinct times, and on different occasions, to say the very same
words to Moses; namely, those, I am Jehovah. And would it not be unreasonable to infer,
as a certain consequence, from this, that here must be some act or acts of the Divine Will,
in determining and disposing the words exactly alike, at different times, wholly without aim
or inducement? But it would be no more unreasonable than to say, that there must be an
act of God without any inducement, if he sees it best, and, for some reasons, determines
that there shall be the same resistance, the same dimensions, and the same figure, in several
distinct places.
If, in the instance of the two spheres, perfectly alike, it be supposed possible that God
might have made them in a contrary position; that which is made at the right hand, being
made at the left; then I ask, Whether it is not evidently equally possible, if God had made
but one of them, and that in the place of the right hand globe, that he might have made that
numerically different from what it is, and numerically different from what he did make it;
though perfectly alike, and in the same place; and at the same time, and in every respect, in
the same circumstances and relations? Namely, Whether he might not have made it numer-
ically the same with that which he has now made at the left hand; and so have left that which
is now created at the right hand, in a state of non-existence? And, if so, whether it would
not have been possible to have made one in that place, perfectly like these, and yet numerically
differing from both? And let it be considered, whether, from this notion of a numerical
difference in bodies, perfectly equal and alike, which numerical difference is something in-
herent in the bodies themselves, and diverse from the difference of place or time, or any
circumstance whatsoever; it will not follow, that there is an infinite number of numerically
different possible bodies, perfectly alike, among which God chooses, by a self-determining
power, when he goes about to create bodies.
Therefore let us put the case thus: Supposing that God, in the beginning, had created
but one perfectly solid sphere, in a certain place: and it should be inquired, Why God created
that individual sphere, in that place, at that time? and why he did not create another sphere
perfectly like it, but numerically different, in the same place, at the same time? Or why he.
chose to bring into being there, that very body, rather than any of the infinite number of
other bodies, perfectly like it; either of which he could have made there as well, and would
have answered his end as well. Why he caused to exist, at that place and time, that individual
roundness, rather than any other of the in finite number of individual rotundities, just like
it? Why that individual resistance, rather than any other of the infinite number of possible
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SECTION VIII. Some further objections against the moral Necessity of God's…