278 ON THE TRINITY. [BOOK XI.
by whicli I remember one. And I remember it just as large
as I saw it. For if I remember it as larger or smaller than I
saw it, tben I no longer remember what I saw, and so I do
not remember it. But because I remember it, I remember it
as large as I saw it; yet I think of it as greater or as less
according to my will. And I remember it as I saw it ; but I
think of it as running its course as I will, and as standing
still where I will, and as coming whence I will, and whither
I will. For it is inmy power to think of it as square, although
I remember it as round ; and again, of what colour I please,
although I have never seen, and therefore do not remember,
a green sun ; and as the sun, so all other things. But owing
to the corporeal and sensible nature of these forms of things,
the mind falls into errorwhen it imagines them to exist with-
out, in the same mode in which it thinks them within, either
when they have already ceased to exist without, but are still
retained in the memory, or when in any other way also, that
which we remember is formed in the mind, not by faithful
recollection, but after the variations of thought.
14. Although it very often happens that we believe also a
true narrative, told us by others, of things which the narrators
have themselves perceived by their senses. And in this case,
when we think the things narrated to us, as we hear them,
the eye of the mind does not seem to be turned back to the
memory, in order to bring up visions in our thoughts ; for we
do not think these things from our own recollection, but
upon the narration of another ; and that trinity does not here
seem to come to its completion, which is made when the spe-
cies lying hid in the memory, and the vision of the man that
remembers, are combined by will as a third. For I do not
think that which lay hid in my memory, but that which I
hear, when anything is narrated to me. I am not speaking of
the words themselves of the speaker, lest any one should think
that I have gone off to that other trinity, which is transacted
without, in sensible things, or in the senses ; but I am think-
ing of those species of material things, which the narrator
signifies to me by words and sounds ; which species certainly
I think of not by remembering, but by hearing. But if we
consider the matter more carefully, even in this case, the limit