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express the subject, and, in his accustomed style, patches and sticks together the cast-off
rags of phrases: poor Isocrates is nibbled at once more, and shorn of words and figures to
make out the point proposed,—here and there even the Hebrew Philo receives the same
treatment, and makes him a contribution of phrases from his own labours,—yet not even
thus is this much-stitched and many-coloured web of words finished off, but every assault,
every defence of his conceptions, all his artistic preparation, spontaneously collapses, and,
as commonly happens with the bubbles when the drops, borne down from above through
a body of waters against some obstacle, produce those foamy swellings which, as soon as
they gather, immediately dissolve, and leave upon the water no trace of their own forma-
tion—such are the air-bubbles of our author’s thoughts, vanishing without a touch at the
moment they are put forth. For after all these irrefragable statements, and the dreamy
philosophizing wherein he asserts that the distinct character of the essence is apprehended
by the divergence of names, as some mass of foam borne downstream breaks up when it
comes into contact with any more solid body, so his argument, following its own spontaneous
course, and coming unexpectedly into collision with the truth, disperses into nothingness
its unsubstantial and bubble-like fabric of falsehood. For he speaks in these words:—“Who
is so foolish and so far removed from the constitution of men, as, in discoursing of men to
speak of one as a man, and, calling another a horse, so to compare them?” I would answer
him,—“You are right in calling any one foolish who makes such blunders in the use of
names. And I will employ for the support of the truth the testimony you yourself give. For
if it is a piece of extreme folly to call one a horse and another a man, supposing both were
really men, it is surely a piece of equal stupidity, when the Father is confessed to be God,
and the Son is confessed to be God, to call the one ‘created’ and the other ‘uncreated,’ since,
as in the other case humanity, so in this case the Godhead does not admit a change of name
to that expressive of another kind. For what the irrational is with respect to man, that also
the creature is with respect to the Godhead, being equally unable to receive the same name
with the nature that is superior to it. And as it is not possible to apply the same definition
to the rational animal and the quadruped alike (for each is naturally differentiated by its
special property from the other), so neither can you express by the same terms the created
and the uncreated essence, seeing that those attributes which are predicated of the latter
essence are not discoverable in the former. For as rationality is not discoverable in a horse,
nor solidity of hoofs in a man, so neither is Godhead discoverable in the creature, nor the
attribute of being created in the Godhead: but if He be God He is certainly not created, and
if He be created He is not God; unless830, of course, one were to apply by some misuse or
customary mode of expression the mere name of Godhead, as some horses have men’s
names given them by their owners; yet neither is the horse a man, though he be called by a
830 Altering Oehler’s punctuation.
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The seventh book shows from various statements made to the Corinthians and…