corporated in, and belonging to, these elements a certain force1762 as well which effects
these intellectual insights and operations by a purely natural effort of their own (such effects,
for instance, as we often see produced by the mechanists, in whose hands matter, combined
according to the rules of Art, thereby imitates Nature, exhibiting resemblance not in figure
alone but even in motion, so that when the piece of mechanism sounds in its resonant part
it mimics a human voice, without, however, our being able to perceive anywhere any mental
force working out the particular figure, character, sound, and movement); suppose, I say,
we were to affirm that all this was produced as well in the organic machine of our natural
bodies, without any intermixture of a special thinking substance, but owing simply to an
inherent motive power of the elements within us accomplishing1763 by itself these opera-
tions—to nothing else, in fact, but an impulsive movement working for the cognition of the
object before us; would not then the fact stand proved of the absolute nonexistence1764 of
that intellectual and impalpable Being, the soul, which you talk of?
Your instance, she replied, and your reasoning upon it, though belonging to the counter-
argument, may both of them be made allies of our statement, and will contribute not a little
to the confirmation of its truth.
Why, how can you say that?
Because, you see, so to understand, manipulate, and dispose the soulless matter, that
the art which is stored away in such mechanisms becomes almost like a soul to this material,
in all the various ways in which it mocks movement, and figure, and voice, and so on, may
be turned into a proof of there being something in man whereby he shows an innate fitness
to think out within himself, through the contemplative and inventive faculties, such thoughts,
and having prepared such mechanisms in theory, to put them into practice by manual skill,
and exhibit in matter the product of his mind. First, for instance, he saw, by dint of thinking,
that to produce any sound there is need of some wind; and then, with a view to produce
1762 εἴ τινα τούτων κατὰ τὸν αὐτὁν λόγον συνουσιωμένην τις εἶναι λέγοι δύναμιν, κ.τ.λ. The difficulty
here is in τούτων, which Krabinger takes as a partitive genitive after εἶναι, and refers to the “elements”; and this
is perhaps the best way of taking it. But still, as Schmidt points out, it is rather the human body than the elements
themselves that ought here to be spoken of as the efficient cause of thought: and so he would either refer τούτων
to τὸν αὐτὸν (“in the same way as these instances just given”), and compares Eurip. Helen., ὄνομα δὲ ταὐτὸν
τῆς ἐμῆς ἔχουσά τις δάμαρτος ἄλλη (Matt. Gr. p. 706); or else would join τούτων with the preceding διάφορος
(with Codd. Mon. D, E).
1763 Cod. Mon. D, ἀποτελούσης. This seems a better reading than that preferred by Krabinger, ἀποτέλεσμα
εἶναι: for ἀποτέλεσμα must be pressed to mean, in order to preserve the sense, “mere result,” i.e. something
secondary, and not itself a principle or cause: the following ἥ, besides, cannot without awkwardness be referred
to ἐνέργειαν
1764 Reading οὐσιὰν οὐκ ἂν ἀποδεικνύοιτο ἦ τὸ μηδ᾽ ὅλως εἶναι;
808
On the Soul and the Resurrection.