One main foundation of the reasons, which are brought to establish the forementioned
love God would be nothing good, nothing in itself praiseworthy, were it not for consequences. Which is not
only absurd, but blasphemous also and shocking. 18. That sentiment is evidently founded on the supposition
that every thing, property, quality, and event, is the fruit of divine will; and therefore that every thing must be
equally good in itself, though relatively good or bad to the individual: even as matter and motion, and their laws,
are equally good in themselves, but not relatively so to the individuals who suffer from them. But this is a great
mistake, as it confounds things totally distinct in their nature, such as positive and negative causes, natural ne-
cessity and moral certainty. Decretive positions and their consequences are one ground of certainty; negative
causes and their consequences are another; therefore, from the certainty of result in the divine view we cannot
rightly infer that all results are decreed. Decretive positions comprehend neither negative causes, nor the nature
of things. For an intelligent being to love God, is agreeable to the nature of things; it is what ought to be inde-
pendent of any decretive position, or legal demand in reference to the case. In like manner, for an intelligent
being to hate God is a voluntary contradiction to the nature of things—or the essence of eternal truth which is
above all will, or is not founded in will—as well as to constitued law. Again, 19. To deny the “intrinsic merit and
demerit of voluntary actions independent on their consequences,” as some do, (Belaham’s Elements, p. 309.) is
to deny the nature of things; and this is nothing less than an attempt to divide eternal unity, to give the lie direct
to essential truth, and to convert the first uncaused essence in to contradictory contingencies. The nature of
things is nothing else, radically, but the nature of God, which is essential truth as well as essential goodness.
Decretive positions, or an arbitrary constitution of things by divine will, therefore can no more alter the intrinsic
merit or demerit of actions, affections, habits, or characters, then divine will can alter the character of essential
truth, or choose real contradictions. Moreover, 20. Ultimate happiness is the effect or consequence of virtue as
a reward. Now to make the merit or excellence of virtue to depend on ultimate happiness, while happiness is
the reward of virtue, is most inconsistent; it is to reward for nothing rewardable. If virtue be not of intrinsic
worth, it must be a mere moral nothing, as to rewardableness, and therefore ultimate happiness would be a reward
for a mere moral nothing; that is, happiness would be no reward, which is contradictory. 21. As to vice, its
consequence is punishment. If indeed this consequence were the mere effect of arbitrary positions, or sovereign
appointment: if it were the plan of God first to cause the existence of vice, and then to punish the subject of it,
as what the good of the whole required, there would be great plausibility in the sentiment we oppose. But the
assumption itself is fundamentally erroneous. It confounds hypothetical antecedents, as the whole of decretive
plans may be termed, with that eternal truth which connects them with their consequences. To suppose the
hatred of God, for instance, to have no intrinsic demerit in it, or that it is bad only as dependent on its con-
sequences; is the same as to say, it is agreeable to the nature of things, comformable to eternal truth, that God
should be hated, and therefore that he must approve of it—only to the agent it is attended with bad consequences.
That is, on the supposition, God has appointed misery as the consequent, for doing nothing that is in itself bad;
yea for doing what is perfectly innocent, agreeable to the nature of things, comformable to eternal truth, and
acceptable to God, as every thing which he appoints must be. Whether such a sentiment be nearest a-kin to
“profound philosophy” or to something else, let the competent reader judge.—W.
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SECTION I. The Essence of the virtue and vice of dispositions of the heart,…